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INTRODUCTION
An educational voucher is a specified amount of money awarded to a student’s parent/guardian that must be used 
for private school tuition for that student. The 
two primary justifications for vouchers are 
that they increase school choice options for 
students and families, thereby ostensibly creating 
competition and increasing school quality 
(Friedman & Friedman, 1962), and that they 
also may save public funds if a voucher costs 
less than the per-pupil public funding amount 
(e.g., Spalding, 2014). Vouchers may also be 
called “scholarships,” and this report uses the two 
terms interchangeably. Publicly funded voucher 
programs have gradually become more prevalent 
since the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program did 
not violate the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment separating church and state (Zelman 
v. Simmons-Harris, 2002). Designs of voucher 
programs differ, but every program interacts 
with a given state’s public school funding formula 
thereby impacting public funds (e.g., state aid to 
school districts). 
 
This comprehensive review compares and 
contrasts the funding mechanisms of the 
general education voucher programs in six 
cases, including five states (Arizona, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin) and the District 
of Columbia. Two cases, Ohio and Wisconsin, 
contain multiple general education voucher 
programs, and each case profile analyzes these 
programs separately. The six cases selected for 
this study all have general education voucher 
programs with publicly available data; we 
excluded other programs based on program 
details (e.g., program eligibility is restricted to 
students with special needs; program data are 
lacking due to the program being very new). This 
review also includes one case (Arizona) that uses 
educational savings accounts instead of vouchers 
or scholarships as defined above. These savings 
accounts are educational funds not earmarked 
for specific schools and are designed to give 
families more leeway in terms of purchasing 
individualized educational services and resources 
for students. However, we included Arizona’s 
savings account program as it was previously 
a voucher program and retains a number of 
characteristics of a voucher program.
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Purpose and Report Structure
The purpose of this comprehensive review and 
the accompanying profiles is twofold: (1) to 
understand how the designs of voucher program 
funding interact with funding formulas to impact 
state and local budgets; and (2) to increase 
transparency around voucher design for taxpayers 
and policymakers. In short, readers of this report 
should gain a sense of how different voucher 
funding mechanisms work.
Research on the actual impact of voucher  
programs on state and local education funds is 
sparse, likely due to the difficulty of obtaining 
data at the level of detail needed to calculate 
simulations of funding scenarios with and 
without the existence of vouchers. Our research 
builds on a small body of work that uses finance 
data from states and districts—the Center for Tax 
and Budget Accountability (2015), Costrell (2008, 
2010), Scafidi (2012), and Spalding (2014). Most 
relevant to our work are Costrell’s analyses (2008, 
2010) of the impact of the Milwaukee Parental 
Choice Program (MPCP); these examinations 
of the MPCP’s net impact on state and local 
revenues incorporate variables such as school 
enrollment and estimates of how many MPCP 
students would have otherwise attended private 
schools. Spalding’s (2014) discussion of state and 
local funding variables is also particularly useful, 
though the analyses of program fiscal effects do 
not include the level of detail used by Costrell. 
Scafidi’s (2012) analysis focuses on the role of 
fixed and variable costs in school funding and the 
relationship of these costs to the fiscal impact of 
vouchers; the estimates of proportions of variable 
and fixed costs served as an estimate in some of 
our analyses. Like Costrell (2008, 2010), Scafidi 
discusses those students who would potentially 
attend private schools without a voucher; unlike 
Costrell, Scafidi does not address the different 
impacts, or burden, on state versus local revenues. 
The Center for Tax and Budget Accountability 
(2015) restricts its analysis of fiscal impact to 
descriptions of how much has been spent on the 
Indiana Choice Scholarship Program thus far 
but also predicts the future growth of voucher 
enrollment and spending in Indiana and potential 
implications for Indiana’s available state education 
revenues overall. 
 
Due to the public governance and funding of 
U.S. public education, more research is needed 
regarding the financial impact and transparency 
of voucher funding systems. A federal, state, or 
local government’s decision to use tax revenues 
to help families pay for private schooling is often 
politically contentious (e.g., Debray-Pelot, 2007) 
and has been the topic of litigation in state and 
federal courts (Mead, 2015). 
 
The following sections of this review provide 
some conceptual background on the funding of 
public school systems and voucher programs, 
detail on the study methodology and limitations, 
and findings from cross-case analysis. Our 
conclusions regarding the impact of voucher 
programs on public education finance fall into 
three primary categories: (1) savings and/or 
losses at the state and local levels; (2) the role 
of enrollment and student count, including 
categorical funding and weights based on student 
characteristics; and (3) fiscal accountability 
policies. These three patterns in the data 
demonstrate how finance policies interact with 
each other to create fiscal impacts significantly 
more complex than the savings calculations 
employed by previous work on voucher finance 
(e.g., Costrell, 2010). Overall, we hope to fill 
some gaps in existing research as well as inform 
policymakers and citizens interested in school 
vouchers and their impacts on school funding.
Funding Mechanisms: 
Interaction of State, Local, and 
Voucher Formulas 
Voucher funding designs vary and thus have 
different effects on program outcomes and 
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implementation. State funding formulas (and, in 
the case of Washington, D.C., district formulas) 
influence the financial impacts that voucher 
programs may have on state and local education 
budgets. Most state funding formulas are based 
on a combination of factors including student 
enrollment, property valuation and tax rates, the 
cost of instruction and other educational and 
non-educational services, and/or minimum per-
pupil funding levels (Lara, Spradlin, & Wodicka, 
2012; Odden & Picus, 2008). Often coded in state 
law, minimum funding amounts or formulas may 
be termed “foundation” or “guaranteed tax base” 
funding (Odden & Picus, 2008). In many funding 
formulas, the local district must contribute a 
certain proportion of the total education revenues 
needed, and this contribution is usually based 
on the wealth of the district. If students leave the 
district due to voucher programs or other reasons, 
the total education revenues needed in that 
district go down, and the state aid goes down, but 
the local contribution will often remain the same. 
 
The movement of students from public districts 
to voucher schools may affect these variables, 
depending on the design of the voucher program. 
Some programs allow local districts to continue 
counting voucher students for funding purposes; 
others do not. Some programs use a multiple-year 
enrollment calculation in order to “cushion the 
fiscal impact” (Odden & Picus, 2008, p. 89) of 
movement in one year, and others use multiple 
counts per year to ensure that current funding 
mirrors current enrollment (Lara et al., 2012). 
Additionally, some states have tax revenue caps 
for local districts, which may prevent districts 
from raising money to cover losses (Ballal & 
Rubenstein, 2009; Blankenau & Skidmore, 2004). 
The complexity of calculations, which in some 
states changes every few years, can also make it 
difficult to fully understand what happens to state 
and local tax dollars when local students receive 
vouchers. 
 
Given the proposition that vouchers are a tool 
for saving public funds (e.g., Spalding, 2014), 
we considered the costs of educating a child in 
a traditional public school building. Although 
some previous analyses of voucher impacts 
on state and local public education funds have 
argued that simply moving a portion of a student’s 
total per-pupil funding amount from public 
schools to voucher schools results in an overall 
cost savings (Spalding, 2014), others disagree, 
as local schools have fixed costs (e.g., Beales, 
1992). Fixed costs constitute a proportion of the 
student’s total per-pupil amount and include 
those expenses that do not change with marginal 
increases or decreases in student enrollment; 
marginal changes refer to increases or decreases 
“at the margin” (i.e., changes of one or a few 
students, as opposed to losing or gaining a 
large number of students). Fixed costs include 
staff salaries, general administration, capital, 
and interest on debts. Scafidi (2012) estimated 
the total cost of educating students in public 
school in 2008–2009 to be on average $12,450, 
with 36 percent of expenses being fixed and 64 
percent variable. He argued that when a voucher 
program transfers less than the equivalent of the 
variable costs, there will be a cost savings to the 
educational agency that retains the difference 
between the total per-pupil funding and the 
voucher amount. In the majority of our cases, 
the state retains this difference. However, the 
funding design of Ohio’s EdChoice program 
allows the local district to retain the difference 
between base per-pupil funding and the voucher 
deduction. In 2008–2009, Ohio’s variable cost per 
student was approximately $7,947, and EdChoice 
vouchers were $5,200 for students in grades 1–12; 
theoretically, there was no adverse effect on a 
public school or district when a student left with 
a voucher. Thus, in 2008–2009, Ohio’s voucher 
program design, using these estimates, yielded a 
cost savings of $2,747 to public schools for each 
student that left via the EdChoice program. (See 
Table 1 for the fixed and variable costs across the 
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six cases examined for this report as calculated by 
Scafidi [2012] for 2008–2009.) 
 
In contrast to the EdChoice design, school 
districts in the other programs do not retain the 
difference; that is, the district does not receive any 
of the per-pupil amount for students who leave 
via a voucher. For these programs, savings are 
realized only at the state level. When a student 
leaves a district via a voucher, the difference 
between the base per-pupil funding and the 
voucher amount stays at the state level; the 
district must therefore stretch its remaining funds 
to cover the unchanged fixed costs. Only when a 
critical mass of students leaves a district will the 
district experience a reduction in fixed costs (e.g., 
costs for teacher salaries decrease when numerous 
students leave and a district hires fewer teachers; 
Beales, 1992; Belfield, 2009).1 
 
Another consideration is that if students leave 
a district due to voucher programs (or other 
reasons), the total education revenues needed in 
that district go down, and the state aid goes down 
correspondingly, but the local tax contribution 
to the district will often remain the same. Thus, 
the design of some voucher programs results in 
a local impact identical or similar to what would 
have occurred had a student left a public school 
for any reason. In this scenario, Scafidi (2012) 
observed that when a student moves from one 
district to another, the “left” school loses state 
and federal funding attached to that student, 
but the local funding that would have funded 
a portion of that student’s education does not 
leave the district.2 Some of the voucher funding 
systems do not, however, transfer the full amount 
of state aid away from the “left” district. In these 
cases, the state aid for voucher students may be 
attributed to that student’s district of residence or 
former assignment. If the voucher amount that is 
deducted from the district’s state aid—the amount 
that “follows the student”—is less than the total 
state and local amount that the public school 
would have spent for this student, this could 
be deemed a savings to the local public school 
district that a student leaves. 
Methodology 
To understand the voucher programs in our six 
cases and how they interact with public school 
funding formulas, we used archival analysis of 







Percent of total costs that 
are short-run fixed costs
Short-run 
variable costs
Percent of total costs 
that are  short-run 
variable costs
Arizona $9,607 $3,715 38.7% $5,892 61.3%
District of Columbia $27,155 $14,134 52.0% $13,021 48.0%
Indiana $10,582 $4,014 37.9% $6,569 62.1%
Louisiana $12,075 $4,276 35.4% $7,799 64.6%
Ohio $12,871 $4,924 38.3% $7,947 61.7%
Wisconsin $12,843 $4,547 35.4% $8,296 64.6%
TABLE 1. ESTIMATED FIXED AND VARIABLE COSTS OF EDUCATING A STUDENT IN A 
PUBLIC SCHOOL IN 2008–2009
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1 Calculating fixed costs by district and the influence of voucher student participants on those fixed costs requires a complex 
analysis outside the scope of our research questions and dataset. However, when considering changes to state and district funds, 
the role of fixed and variable costs should be kept in mind. 
2 The short-lived 2012–2013 policy in Louisiana using the Minimum Foundation Program to fund vouchers is an exception;  
however, it was quickly overturned by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
Source: Scafidi (2012).
5Center for Evaluation & Education Policy          1900 East Tenth Street, Bloomington, IN 47406          ceep.indiana.edu
from state legislative bureaus, financial records 
including budgets and fiscal reporting, and 
state records of school funding formulas and 
disbursements. Data were collected using website 
access where possible as well as via open-records 
requests. We relied heavily on primary sources, 
using secondary sources with caution where 
relevant or necessary for corroboration or 
completeness; careful attention was given to data 
collection in terms of verification of authenticity 
and accuracy (Heck, 2004; Merriam, 1988). Our 
research process was iterative as we worked to 
identify any trends or differences in the cases 
studied, using a cycle of data collection, data 
reduction, data display, conclusion drawing, 
and verification (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
We used the above cycle of cross-case analysis 
with the purpose of identifying common or 
divergent patterns (Stake, 2006). We also used 
simple quantitative calculations to understand the 
impact on state and local budgets, when this level 
of financial data was available. 
 
We limited our focus to general education 
voucher programs, as these have different 
policy implications than programs targeted at 
students with special needs. We also recognize 
that Arizona’s Empowerment Savings Accounts 
differ in some ways from vouchers that must 
be used at specific private schools, but they are 
similar enough in terms of policy design to 
be meaningfully included in our comparative 
analysis. We did not consider other programs 
based on their structure (e.g., a focus only on 
students with special needs or students who live 
in towns that do not have public schools) or 
recentness (i.e., there are not enough data yet 
for meaningful comparative analyses). In 2015, 
Nevada passed the first universal education 
savings account (ESA) program. Florida, 
Mississippi, and Tennessee all have ESAs but 
only for families of students with special needs. 
Likewise, other voucher programs serve students 
with special needs only: Arkansas (2015), Florida 
(1999), Georgia (2007), Mississippi (2012 and 
2013), North Carolina (2013), Oklahoma (2010), 
and Utah (2005). In 2013, North Carolina added 
a voucher program for low-income households, 
which was implemented in 2014. Finally, Vermont 
and Maine have long funded private education for 
students living in towns without public schools 
(since 1869 and 1873, respectively).  
 
Limitations
This report’s limitations include gaps in 
information based on limited availability, 
completeness, and reliability. Much of the data we 
used were not produced specifically for research 
purposes and were organized or presented in 
different formats that were not comparable 
across cases. Additionally, each case has its own 
political, social, and cultural context which 
must be acknowledged as we draw comparisons. 
Finally, we acknowledge that, as researchers, we 
are reading, interpreting, and evaluating texts, 
and we must be cautious of our own subjectivity 
(Heck, 2004). The Center for Evaluation & 
Education Policy seeks to provide nonpartisan 




Proponents of voucher programs often rely on 
a rationale of cost savings of public funds (Hoyt 
& Lee, 1998; Spalding, 2014). Thus, our analysis 
looks critically at the details of these voucher-
related spending changes. Throughout this 
analysis, “state and local savings and costs” refer 
to increases and decreases in the availability and 
expenditures of tax revenues. For example, a 
state-level savings is a decrease in the expenditure 
of tax revenue at the state level and thus a benefit 
across all state taxpayers; in contrast, a local 
cost would be an increased spending of local tax 
revenue and thus a burden to district taxpayers. 
 
We also examined each state’s student funding 
formula and the funding mechanism for the 
6
allocations to follow the student to the private 
school. This system was found to be in violation 
of the state’s constitution; now an annually 
appropriated line item in the state budget directly 
funds Louisiana’s voucher program. 
 
The impact of student eligibility policies on 
savings and losses
Eligibility policies also impact the amount of 
savings or losses incurred by states. In five of 
the six cases (Arizona [with a few exceptions], 
the District of Columbia, Louisiana, Ohio’s 
EdChoice program, and Wisconsin), students 
had to previously attend a public school in order 
to receive a voucher; that is, students already 
attending private schools by paying privately 
could not receive a voucher. Indiana, Arizona 
(for certain categories of students), and Cleveland 
have different eligibility policies. Indiana recently 
added pathways allowing non-public school 
students to use Choice scholarships. In 2014–
2015, approximately 80 percent of new students in 
the Indiana program had no record of attending 
an Indiana public school (Indiana Department of 
Education, 2015). The additional cost of funding 
these new students from state funds can be seen 
as a loss to the state. At the local level, these new 
voucher students have no impact since these 
students would never have been counted in a 
local district’s membership. Thus, funding these 
new voucher students creates a new cost to the 
state instead of a transfer of funds. Arizona allows 
children of active-duty or killed-in-action armed 
forces members to receive a scholarship without 
having previously attended a public school (Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. 15-2401(6)(a)(vi–vii)). In the case of 
the Cleveland program, students not previously 
enrolled in a public school are also eligible for 
vouchers; until late 2015 this eligibility was 
limited to no more than 50 percent of recipients, 
but that limitation was removed for the 2016 
fiscal year (Ohio Am. Sub. H.B. 64 § 3313.975(B), 
2015). 
Center for Evaluation & Education Policy          1900 East Tenth Street, Bloomington, IN 47406          ceep.indiana.edu
voucher program, including the timing and 
application of enrollment counts (average daily 
membership, or ADM) within the funding 
formulas, and other issues such as categorical or 
complexity funding. By examining the interaction 
among these mechanisms, we discerned 
potential sources of losses and savings that 
might be realized by states and districts. Here we 
summarize several key patterns and differences 
across our six cases. (See each case profile for 
complete details.) 
 
Interactions of State and 
Voucher Funding: Savings and 
Losses 
Funding for vouchers in each of the six cases 
comes from either the state general fund (or, in 
the case of the District of Columbia, from federal 
funds) or from the state portion of a district’s total 
operating funds. Louisiana’s program, Arizona’s 
Empowerment Scholarship Accounts, Indiana’s 
Choice Scholarship Program, and Wisconsin’s 
statewide and Racine programs3 are funded 
completely through the state general funds. In 
Ohio’s EdChoice program, the state deducts 
the voucher amount from the state funds that 
are awarded to districts, but districts may keep 
a portion of each resident voucher student’s 
per-pupil state aid, depending on the district’s 
wealth. The case of Wisconsin—which has at 
times shared the cost of vouchers between state 
and local districts—is particularly complex due 
to its longevity and to several funding changes. 
Currently, however, the statewide and Racine 
programs are moving towards shared funding 
between the local district and the state general 
fund, while the Milwaukee program is moving 
towards full state funding. Unique to the District 
of Columbia, program monies come from federal 
dollars, not state or local funds that could be 
seen as diverted from the “left” public school. 
Louisiana originally allowed both state and local 
3 Policy changes as of fiscal year 2016 will require local districts to contribute a gradually increasing proportion of these program 
costs; see Wisconsin profile for more detail.
Other factors: Partial funding, partial 
counts, mitigating policies, and district size
The funding structure of voucher programs 
can impact budgets in other ways as well. For 
example, students in Indiana leaving their 
assigned public school are only awarded a 
voucher worth a maximum of 90 percent of the 
state per-pupil funding for that year; the same is 
true of Arizona. The remaining ten percent can 
be seen as a cost savings to the state, although this 
amount maybe be used for state administration 
of the programs. With Ohio’s EdChoice program, 
districts receive a portion of state funding for all 
voucher students who reside in that district (the 
per-pupil state funding and local amount minus 
the voucher amount). The Cleveland Scholarship 
Program allows certain categories of students to 
be counted in ADM, but not all. Under current 
law, Wisconsin’s complex revenue limit formula—
intended to equalize revenues between high- and 
low-wealth districts—interacts with the statewide 
voucher program by allowing certain categories 
of voucher students to be considered for the 
purposes of revenue limits (Wisconsin Act 55 § 
3421p, 2015; Wisconsin Department of Public 
Instruction, 2015). 
In the District of Columbia, the federal laws 
authorizing vouchers also awarded additional 
funds to public and charter schools with 
the intent “that funding for the opportunity 
scholarship program would not lead to a 
reduction in funding for the District of Columbia 
public and charter schools” (Pub. Law No. 112-10 
§ 3002(4), 2011). However, there is no evidence 
that these allocated amounts are equal to the 
financial losses resulting from participation in 
the voucher program. The “left” schools in the 
District of Columbia also face the same losses 
regarding marginal and fixed costs as in the five 
state cases. The District of Columbia funding 
allocations are based on four-year enrollment 
projections and a comprehensive staffing model, 
which may allow the District to cushion the loss 
of voucher students through distribution. On the 
other hand, the thoroughness of the District’s 
projection process suggests that projections would 
take voucher students into account, resulting in 
“left” schools receiving reduced funding based on 
reduced enrollment. 
 
School district size also has implications. In 
districts that contribute a local contribution to 
per-pupil funding, smaller districts bear a slightly 
heavier burden when voucher students shift to 
a private school; in small districts, the loss of 
funding for a single student has a proportionately 
greater impact on the total funding amount 
and on the distribution of the remaining fixed 
costs. Additional funding policies can amplify 
these losses. In Louisiana, for example, the per-
pupil minimum foundation amount is weighted 
to assist the smallest districts with fixed costs; 
thus, smaller districts lose even more than the 
minimum amount per each leaving voucher 
student, as compared to their larger counterparts, 
which has a greater proportional budget impact. 
 
Enrollment and Student Count 
Mechanisms 
The implications of enrollment and student 
count mechanisms differ based on how voucher 
students are counted in district membership and 
whether or not an additional local contribution 
is expected or allowed to offset any state aid lost 
to voucher students. Even in the cases where 
100 percent of funding comes from state funds, 
the impacts on the state and local levels vary 
depending on the overall funding formula and 
the structure of the voucher program. Many 
state funding systems allocate money to districts 
based on each district’s ADM. The method of 
ADM counting has implications for funding. 
Some states use a previous year’s count or the 
average of several previous years, which cushions 
districts with decreasing enrollment. Some states 
use a single count during the current year, which 
does not involve adjustments for increasing or 
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decreasing enrollment later in the year, and some 
states use a multiple-count mechanism, which 
allows funding to more precisely mirror current 
enrollment throughout the year. Gain or loss 
of student enrollment can be due to a number 
of factors, not just departing voucher students. 
The local district, however, continues to incur 
the same fixed costs despite the loss of voucher 
students. Thus, there also may be a burden at the 
local level, as the same revenues are now spread 
over one (or more) fewer students. Similarly, in 
the District of Columbia, the loss of a student 
to a voucher program does equate to a loss of 
incoming funding that would have been received 
for that student. Thus, the method by which a 
state or district counts its students can play a role 
in the financial impact of a voucher program 
upon a particular district’s budget. 
 
ADM provisions interact with voucher program 
design in all of the six cases (see Table 2). In four 
of the cases (Arizona, the District of Columbia, 
Indiana, and Louisiana), students in the voucher 
program were simply not counted in ADM; state 
and district funding for districts changed in the 
same way it would have had students left the state 
for any other reason. In Wisconsin and Ohio, 
during particular years and particular programs, 
students were counted towards a district’s ADM 
and then state aid for those districts was diverted 
to the voucher program. 
Count complexities: Lag in enrollment 
growth/decline, hold-harmless, and 
categorical funding
In addition to ADM student counts, each case’s 
overarching formula includes provisions that 
may change the base student count. Provisions 
either (1) respond to enrollment growth/decline 
or (2) allocate additional funding for certain 
student categories. As Table 2 shows, Wisconsin 
uses a prior-year count for current year funding, 
which introduces a slight lag regarding funding 
losses accompanying student enrollment declines. 
At the time of publication, half of the cases use 
multiple-count mechanisms for current year 
funding, which adjusts local funding throughout 
the school year based on enrollment fluctuations. 
As Lara, Spradlin, and Wodicka (2012) point out, 
using a previous year or single-count mechanism 
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TABLE 2. COMPARING AVERAGE DAILY MEMBERSHIP MECHANISMS ACROSS CASES
Case Count mechanism and changes by year
Arizona Traditional public schools used previous year’s 100th day count until fiscal year 2016–2017 and now use current year’s 100th day count
District of Columbia Estimated enrollment based on previous four years’ enrollment and expected changes; actual student count by October 15 for current year funding
Indiana
Prior to 2011: Current year 
funding based on average count 
from previous four years and 
current year
2011–2013: Single count date for 
current year funding
2013 to present: Multiple 
count dates (2) for current year 
funding
Louisiana Multiple count dates (3) for 2013–2016
Ohio Prior to 2007, single count week for current year funding
2007–2014: ADM is calculated 
using 75 percent of the first 
count week and 25 percent of the 
second count week
2014 to present: Multiple count 
dates (3)
Wisconsin Funding based on the full-time equivalent (FTE) student counts taken as an average of two count days during the previous year
Sources: Ariz. Rev. Stat. 15-185, 15-901; D.C. Code §§ 38-1804.01–02; H. Enrolled Act 1134 (2006); H. Enrolled Act 1189 (2012); 
Ohio Am. Sub. H.B. 59 § 120.10 (2014); Ohio Am. Sub. H.B. 66 § 3317.02(D) (2005); Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 55 
(2014); Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 99 (2012); Wis. Stat. § 121.05(1)(a).
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can provide financial stability to districts but also 
may incentivize districts to put less effort into 
retaining students after the annual count. 
 
States can create policy responses to fix 
unintended consequences of count mechanisms. 
If other policies in place—typically called hold-
harmless policies—cushion marked decreases 
in enrollment, changes in student enrollment 
due to voucher programs may only impact a 
local district to a limited extent. While none 
of these policies in our cases were established 
specifically in response to changes in voucher 
enrollment, their existence does influence the 
impact of voucher enrollment. At some point 
during their voucher program histories, Arizona, 
Indiana, Louisiana, and Ohio have each had a 
hold-harmless policy in place. Arizona’s statutes 
include a provision by which districts may recoup 
funds lost through sharp decreases in enrollment 
(high school level only; Ariz. Rev. Stat. 15-954). In 
Indiana, prior to fiscal year 2016, district funding 
losses were limited to 10 percent between the 
September and February counts; for example, if a 
district lost 20 percent of its enrollment, it would 
only lose 10 percent of its funding. Starting in 
fiscal year 2016, however, Indiana school districts 
lose funding commensurate with enrollment 
loss. Louisiana has several specific districts in 
which funding changes due to the switch to the 
Minimum Foundation Program in 2011 are 
gradually cushioned from year to year; for these 
districts, the hold-harmless policy makes it less 
likely that they would feel the effects of a sharp 
loss in membership. In Ohio, “transitional aid 
guarantees” provide districts with a guarantee of 
at least the previous year’s base or total level of 
funding, depending on the policy wording in a 
given year. 
 
Whether voucher students are originally counted 
in a district’s ADM also affects categorical or 
weighted funding aids. These aids include, for 
example, poverty-based aids (based on the 
district’s concentration of students categorized 
as living in poverty); district-wide aids for 
interventions or professional development; small 
or rural school assistance; and transportation 
funding. Categorical funding may be awarded to 
districts based on the total number or proportion 
of students falling into that category, and may be 
awarded as a per-pupil lump sum or calculated 
as a ratio, or weight, multiplied by the number 
of students in that category. If a voucher student 
is counted in that category before the voucher 
deduction, the district may receive the categorical 
funding for that student as well. If the voucher 
student is counted in the total ADM but not in 
categorical counts, the district would not receive 
any categorical funding, even if that student 
would have received categorical funding in the 
public system. When voucher students are not 
counted in ADM, the district receives no base 
level funding nor any of these aids. 
Special education funding also interacts with 
ADM counts and voucher funding, though 
in a different way. In most programs, funding 
for students with disabilities does not follow a 
student to their chosen voucher school. There 
are four exceptions: the Cleveland Scholarship 
Program (CSP), the Arizona ESAs, Indiana 
Choice Scholarships Program, and the Louisiana 
program. The CSP statutes include a provision 
allowing “an increase in the basic scholarship 
amount” for students receiving special education 
services (Ohio Rev. Code § 3313.978(C)(2)). 
Indiana allows parents/guardians to choose 
whether the private school or district will provide 
services and receive the funding. Mechanisms in 
Arizona and Louisiana are nearly identical, with 
each state’s code awarding all funding that would 
have been awarded to a student’s previous school 
to the voucher school (or account). In these four 
programs, the state does not experience any cost 
savings around categorical or weighted funds; in 
the other remaining programs, however, the state 
would save the amounts which would have been 
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paid to public school districts for categorical and 
weighted funding. When students with disabilities 
leave via a voucher, districts in both cases lose 
the attached state funding which could affect 
the district’s ability to support special education 
and other categorical programs (Ahearn, 2010). 
Indiana is the only state with publicly available 
data regarding the number of students receiving 
more than the minimum per-pupil voucher, but 
no state or district provides data on the number 
and types of weights that voucher students were 
awarded. 
 
Fiscal Accountability Policies 
Analysis of fiscal accountability provisions 
demonstrated a number of relevant categories 
across cases (see Table 3). Regarding financial 
records, institutional and/or public reporting 
on fund use, and enforcement mechanisms, 
specific accountability requirements vary 
widely with one exception: in every case, the 
state department of education (or comparable 
entity) has the primary responsibility for 
meeting any fiscal accountability requirements. 
In some cases, private schools also have some 
responsibilities regarding organizational data 
collection and reporting. Table 3 offers an 
overview of requirements and other relevant 
fiscal accountability patterns across cases. 
 
TABLE 3. CROSS-CASE COMPARISON OF FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
AND PATTERNS
Arizona District of Columbia Indiana Louisiana Ohio Wisconsin
Fiscal accountability 
requirements in state or 
comparable code
Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Responsible entities 
































Required audits Yes Yes No Yes No Yes




and to the 
public upon 
request]
Minimal Minimal Yes Yes
Reports have been 
published by other 
entities
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Evidence of fiscal 
accountability 
problems
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Enforcement 
mechanisms specified Yes No No Yes No Yes
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Conclusion 
This comprehensive review contributes to policy 
conversations about the political and taxpayer 
implications of school vouchers. Although a few 
earlier reports examined these issues (Center for 
Tax and Budget Accountability, 2015; Costrell, 
2010; Scafidi, 2012), no cross-case comparisons 
exist with the level of detail included here. Even 
though the six cases presented in this report 
vary in terms of specific funding policies, all six 
suggest impacts on state and/or local budgets. 
In almost all cases, districts lose at least some 
portion of their state per-pupil aid when students 
opt into voucher programs, but competitive 
effects are sometimes mitigated depending on the 
specific funding formulas. Count mechanisms, 
district characteristics, and individual student 
categorical weights add complexity when 
calculating the effects of funding. Each of 
these variables may or may not be accessible or 
transparent to policymakers and/or taxpayers, 
as the analysis of accountability policies 
demonstrates. 
 
In weighing the effects of voucher programs, 
policy details are of considerable importance. 
In order to make informed decisions about 
whether a voucher program design meets their 
expectations regarding public governance, 
funding, and educational services, policymakers 
and taxpayers should understand the potential 
impact that specific provisions may have on state 
and local revenues. Our data and analysis call into 
question the rhetoric used by both supporters and 
detractors of voucher programs. The authors hope 
this analysis will spur policymakers and taxpayers 
to demand detailed and readily available public 
information regarding specific voucher provisions 
and how those provisions translate into fiscal 
impacts on state and local levels.
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